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CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF THE SUBJECT
Man'. proper study may indeed be
out out tor him.

~or

man~

but it it is. man haa his work

in his philosophizing

maD

has attempted to explain

a host ot things. but none has he tound so ditfioult to tatham as himselt.
Fra. Thales on all Greek philosophers had attempted to explain nature and
had believed--however implausible their solutions may seem to us--that
they had done a good job.

But there never was a philosopher in that time.

or in any time. that was temerariou8 enough to say that he had explained
man perteotly.
It was not. in taot. till (possibly) the time ot Soorates betore
man'a nature a8 man was in any true way adverted tOI betore any step was
even made in the right direotion; betore. paradoxically. the real problems
were even met.

Thus when. with Plato and Aristotle. man was seen to be

more than a sentient being. one ot the toremost ot these problems was
introduoed--the problem ot ho. this being kno.s.

For. it man is both ani-

mal and rational, he must have the two-fold knowledge consequent on these
"for.a.".

And. ot course. man does experience a knowledge that is particu-

lar, and one Whose note is universality.

Bow even a none too rarefied idea

ot What "spiritual" connoted indicates that there 1. a marked ditterenoe
between these two cognitions; while a fuller and more complete kno.ledge

.t the term has caused same to make this ditterenoe almost a diversity.
And it is in this that the problem lies, tor the two must sameho. be
reoonoiled in man.

Now, save in the oonstruotion ot a philosophioal
1

2

aystem, it can hardly be said that anyone doubts man's (essential) unity.
It i. man then, who both "sees", and "hears",
man who knows this tree and "tree " •

and also "thinks".

It is

But, save that something 1s being

known in both Cases, it is difficult to reconcile

~

tree with tree; i.e.

how it is possible to get from the one to the other; how the apparent
common-sense fact that we know this tree through "sense experience" can be
reconoiled with the fact that in knowing "tree" we transcend senseexperience.
The answers, needless to say, are multitudinous and varied, but they
all dOe-and must--have this note in common; namely that intellectual knowled~e,

as being more abstract in nature, must have samething to aocount tor

the ditterenoe.

And so, all must in some way give the intellect the

power--though this power need not be the intellect's own--ot excluding the
greater number ot "non-necessary" notes in the sense data.

And it is in

this root need ot abstraction that the notion ot an "active" or "agent"
intellect takes its rise.

CHAPTER II
DEVEL0PJ4ENT BEFORE ST. THOMAS

It i8 almost a belaboring of the point to say that the idea of an intellect was as slow in taking its form, or, for that matter of even being
conceived, as that of "spirit" itself.

If Thomas Aquinaa be taken as the

culmination of the speoulation on this subject, it is evident that its history is an extremely long one.

And again using Aquinas as the acme of suoh

speoulation, it will be well to see how this peak was prepared for by his
predecessors.

For what is called epistemology was the subject of muoh speo-

ulation previous to his time, and in no noetic

~~s

it possible to ignore

this most salient faot of manta dual knowledge.
The theories of knowledge of Pre-Socratios were, as has been hinted at,
materialist.

For sinoe there was not as yet even a slightly adequate con-

ception of spirit (witness the disappointment of both Aristotle and Plato at
the failure of Anaxagoras to really grasp his "invention". "nous"). there waa
DO real distinction made between sensation and intelleotion.

Thus, to oite

the outstanding incident, Empedocles saw knowledge as being caused--via
"emanations" and "pores"--by "like" in us knOwing the material "like" outside us.

And the same general charge can be SUbstantiated of all these early

epistemologies.

The oonsequenoe, therefore, was that there was actually no

apeculation on an abstraotive power, sinoe it was wholly unneoessary.
With Sooratea' more realistio reoognition of man's nature the possibility of an abstraotive foroe arises, however.

For he ·studied the conditions

of human knowledge, developed the "Sooratic conoept", and 60 paved the way
for a reference-... albeit an oblique referenoe--to 80me need of differentiating
3

the two kiDds ot mowledgeJ tor it was tr_ his master's illYestigatiol18 that
Plato tormulated hla theory ot the Ideas.

Again though, since tor his man's

ideas are innate, and, sinoe he considers sense perception to be the mere
eocasien tor .amehow "knowing" these ideas, the abstraction here i. an
emasoulated one.

For here the neoessary abstraotion is taken oare ot by

partioipation in the Ideas; there need be no "abstractimg" ot essenoes "in"
SQBe sensible notea, tor essenoes already exist in the mind. l
.ew bet_en the two extremes of a materialism, all. the one hand, and a
pure idealism, on the other, was a solution ottered by one wno oODsidered
hiJuelt aa the oulmination ot Greek philosophy.

Aristotle's expl&nation ot

knowledge "s--a8 must always be the Oa88--0ne which tollowed logioally
his detinition et man, ot the union et soul and bedy.

OD

As such it did not

malee man's t . kinds ot knowledge diyerse, but merely ditterent.

Thus he

says that through the medium ot a sensible objeot and the seTeral sense
ergans sensation is lIl8.de possible. The "result" ot this sensation is a
representation lett over in the imagination, and this re8Ult is alse the
term ot senae knowledge_
Then intellectual tno_ledge

be~iD.8J

and tor making the tral18ition he

introduoes a power ot abstraotion as part ot the intelleotual tunotion in
man. Kan' 8 intellect is distinguished aa to its actiYe and passiYe (as
well as aotualized) tunotiol18. 2 the tormer, he says, aakea the aensible
1 ot. l'heatetu8 (p .150a) J Fhaedo (p .1006 h alao Aristotle, lletaphysios
I 9 (99r6 3) J et alibi.
2 Aristotle, B! .Anima, III, 5 (430410).
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datu. now repositing in the imagination oapable of being known in a univeral
fashion; the latter understands an.d molVB this now somehow transtormed datum.
The prooess whereby the intelleot as agent makes the phantasm (as the
sensible datu. or image is oalled) oapable ot being known is oalled by h1a
"abstraotionll , i.e., trom that sensible likeness, -..hioh is partioular, an.
intelleotual likeness, -..hioh is universal, is somehow made to be in the possible intellect.

(It may be noted here that1his statement ot

~

Aristotle

said is that ot st. Thamas--though there is much evidence for its being
accepted.

fhere are. however, dissenters to such an interpretation.)

Kost prominent ot these dissenters were the Arabian iDterpreters ot
4ristotle, who, as a consequence, had a difterent cenoeption ot the nature
ot the aotive intelleot.

This sohool of thought, though protessing to hold

the true doctrine of Aristotle, aotually oombined his teaohing with BewPlatonio a.udMLbio vieWlS.
op~

4 major oharaoteristio of this eoleotio

p~ilos

was ita inaistenoe, in one form or another. ot an intelleot oammon to

all mankind. 3 And the two men who most rigorQusly held this Tiew were
Avioenna and 4Terroes.

B! Aniaa

The former took certain statements in the third book

to mean that the active intellect is separate and common to all man-

kind; and the latter extended th1sconception to both intelleots.

Thus,

aooording to Averroes, each man. has his own proper phantasms by means of which
the separate intellect is joined. inan accidental union with eaoh individual
aocording to that individual's personal disposition.

And thus here, too,

abstraotion i8 not man's, but is aocaaplished by a separate substanoe
'revealing

intelligioil~ty

to Qach

lfl&l1.

3 St. Shomas Aquinas. Summa Theologioa, I, 79, 4, Resp.

A tinal greatsouroe of Thomas' dootrine on this subjeot was st.
Augustine, the "Christian Plato".

From this soubriquet the inferenoe is

(in this oase) warranted that their reasoning is quite dissimilar.

For,

like Plato, Augustine looks upon sensation aaf not the cause, but solely
the ocoasion for knowledge,4 the oocasion for the re-awakening of the aoul
te knowledge which it had already possessed.

there is not then, that

strict oasual activity attributed to objeots in Aquinas' theory.

For

Augustine there are two ways in which the intellect arrives at the knowledge
of things, the first is ira. sense knowledge, and prooeeds to the causes
of the sensib1es and finally to their Ultimate cause, God, the seoond is
from introspection wherein we find truth dwelling within us ("Noli foraa
exire, in te ipsua redi, in interiore hamine habeat veritate").

The

souroe of all truth is God, in Rim the essential types of truth are found;
by Him the eotypes experienced in our world of conorete existenoe and
oorreaponding to the prototypes of God's external
so that, knOwing the eotypea, _

~ind

are "illumined",

rise to a knowledge of truth, and from

truth to Him Who i8 its author. 6 Henoe--although n. one has ever been able
to determine fully--if there i8 any sort of an abstractive process here it
ia en. ~erformed" by Truth Himself.

4 ".entire non eat oorporis, sed animae per oorpus, ••• " DE GENESI AD
LITTERAM, III, 6,7, col. 282. <et alibi).
6 ot. Bourke'll InterestiDg CODl1Ilentary in Augustine's Quest
74 f., 200, 210 f., et passim.

2!. Wisdom,

CHAPTER III
BASES OF AQUINAS' DOCTRINE
Thaaas was not, then, alone when he iDrestigated the relationa between
senaible and intelleotual knowledge.

Available to his study ot the rela-

tions ot phantasm and int ell eot (to use his terms) were either the aotual
work~t

his great predeoessors or else their teaohing becQme the tradition

ot same lohool ot philosophy. But he was alone, in that he oould not aooept
any ot the solutions "in toto·, tor he oould never aocept their bases as

being

true~

In any true foundation there is no "bridging" of senaible and

intellectual knowiedge, unless there be some rapprochement made between body
and soul.

If the union ot soul and body oannot be aome way explained,

neither OaDm.an's dual knowledge, and courersely, however this union is
explained, so will that of sensible and intellectual knowledge be.

Thus,

ocrrespending to the above enumerated theories of abstraotion, man ha. been
variously defined as purely material, as a pure soul "entangled" with a
body, as a oompound of soul and body, as a body 'With 80me separate intelligenoe guiding it, and again--though oertainly not in the full sense of
Plato--aa a soul uling a boQy.
4llth. materialist epistemologies were, ot course, feunded en a
philosophy of man whiab dellied his having a soul, henoe they were unaooeptable to Thomas.

But the systeu of Plato and Aristotle were not of suoh a

sort as to be "prima faoie" rejeoted.

4s a matter of taot, these were the

two dominant philosophies of Thomas' time, and hence defined
adherents.

"lB8l1"

for their

Without going into the "problaa of the soul in the thirteenth
7

8

oentury· and the struggles undergone before the triumph of the Aristotelianlike (not. of oourse. totally so. for "it cannot be. after all. gainsaid
that Thoma •••• was strongly under an Augustinian influenoe")l detinition of
Thomas, there oan b. noted two deteots into whioh any definition ot man might
tall into--and whioh these systems did not steer olear ots

Theae defeots

are the failure to preserve man'. quite obvious unity (by radically separating
soul

~d

body), and the consideration of the body as being at least "exoess

baggage", and often as being a pod ti ve hindrance to true human life.

And

the results of this unfortunate diohotomizing rendered suoh a philosopher's
noetio of the same value.

.

Again avoiding too thorough a consideration of what man is for st •
Thomas, it oan be noted here that the essential note of the relation of
soul and body 1s that of matter and form; the soul is the SUbstantial form
of the body.

To say this is to say. in effeot. thats

the soul "makes" the whole man, the whole bei~,
a reality--"form a substantialia dat esse",
the soul, as form gives the oomposite being its
speoitic human oharacter; and that
it is the souroe ot all aotivities in the organism.
In short. when the soul is oalled "form" it is meant that it is the actuating
prinoiple both for itself and for the body; and that it is incomplete by
itself and "campleted" when animating the body.

Hut the soul does subsist,

as well as "inform" J it is SUbsistent beoause "it has an operation of
its very own. in which the body does not share. 2 Whatever exists must

1 Wilhelm i;)ohneider, "Hestimmung des verhaltnisses" in Baumkers Beitrage.
XX,VII,3--1930,50.
2 St. Thomas Aquinas, ~umma Theologioa, I.75.2.aesp ••
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have reason for its

existence~

and that reason is its act.

The

soul~

then,

as a subsistent being, has operations which are peculiar to it as a spirtual
form, viz., intellection and volition.

But the soul, as a for.m, is, apart

from the body, unable to attain to the object of its operation; it can only
acquire knowledge naturally when united to the body, for only then can it
apprehend its natural object.

(The case of the soul "in patria" doe. not

fall under these conditions.)
Hence there is a certain urgency in Aquinas' philosophy concerning the
relation of sensible and intellectual knowledge, which is not to be found in
the other, aboTe-mentioned, systems.

For here man is overtly and unequiv-

ocally stated to be a unit,y; and hence his manifestly dual knowledge--the
objects for sensation being any sensible body, and for intelleotion "the
quiddity or nature existing in oorporeal matter u3--must be either explained,
or "double truth" stultifioation acoepted.

Likewise it is most certainly

to be noted that the question has undergone a transformation here.
here the problem of trying to reconoile an organic

phanta~

For,

with a spirtual

soul is not a problem of the soul oonfronted with a corporeal organ, but,
rather, of the soul with one of its power5 confronted with another power of
the very same soul.

(For the soul acts in its powersJ and thus even those

processes whioh take place in corporeal organs emanate from the soul as
their remote prinoiple--since the soul is the form of the whole body.

Every

funotion, thus, oonsoious or unconscious, is psychioal.)
There are, then, the phantasm, the representation of a material thing in
the imagination; and the intellect as in some way potential to knowing the
same material thing.

CllAPTER IV
DISPUTBD POUlTS ON THE NATURE OF THB "INTELLECTUS AGEHS"

But ie all this really so manitest?

Has St. Thomas the right to oon-

olude t. aa "int.lleotua agena"?

Is there a "raison d' ~tre" tor the

intelleot as aotiTe in this way?

In oppoai tion to Plato, St. Thomas main-

tains that the ans.rs to all these are attirma.ti.,.e J that there oould,
indeed, be no intelleotual knowledge unless suoh were the answer.
knowledge is the "intentional union ot power and objeot".

For

!Tow the objeot

ot the humaa intelleot in this lite is not something immediately aTailable
to itJ tor the intelligible tor our 1ntelleot
is .ot something existing in reality, nor
is it intelligibleJ tor the possible intelleot understands something as one in many
and .t many. ISuch. however. is not tound
in reality •••
4nd beoause "what 18 not oould not 'move' a.D;Ytbing". there could apparently
be no intellectual knowledge in man unless there were some way t. make the
intelligible objeots, whioh are the proper objeots ot our intelleot,
intelligible to us.
It is the "universal" then whioh is to be "aeen",

but in this "aeeing"

there ari.ea dittioulty.
Bow sinoe our knowledge is at the beginning through a "speoies"

(a "species" arising in the sense and terminating in the phantasm) it might
be asked why this species oannot suttice to overoaae the barrierJ tor both
a "species· and a "phantasm" are oertainly in sOlle way no1; •• "individual"
1

r
11

as the existent physical reality.

Further it maybe noted that all that

is known ot a particular objeot mast in 80me way be in the phantasa representing ita tor surely it cannot be said that, when the soul gets to know
some particular object, it gets to knowmoro than the "imaged" objeot
oontain..

It the phanta8Dl 1s "01'11 the objeot, only through it ou

~hing

01' the object be known.

But again Thomas says that such is impossible
beoause the "speoies 1l whioh is in the imagination i8 ot _he same kind as that in the
sense, tor both are material and individual;
but the Ipeoies which is in the intelleot i.
ot a ditterent kind, tor it i8 universal. 2
It i. not possible, theretore, to proceed tr. . .enae to phutasa to intelle.t
in

aD

uninterrupted linea
••• the torma ~ich are in the senses oan
attect torma in the imagination, mOving the
imagination aa being ot a similar nature.
The torma in the imagination however, ina_uGh
as they are partioular, oannot oause intelligible torml--einee the latter are univer.al in
oharaoter.~

~t might still be said, without being hyperoritical, that there is no

"raisOll d' 'itre" established tor the aotive intelleot.

Fer might there not

be "intelligible,," ter u. somewhere else than in theae "olothed in material
oonditions"?

But this ia aotually to rule out the arguaeut altogether,

tor no longer is there agreeme~ even on basia points.

2 St. Thama&, De Spiritualibus Cr.at~r~s,lO,ad17.
3 St. Thomas, De Anima,4,adl.

For~ for Thomas the

12
objeot ot the intelleot in this lite is the quiddity ot a sensible thing;
therefore, it we partioipate--a'la Plato--in "forms ot natural things
subaisting apart trom matter" we are no longer a180 talking about the same

Yet, admitting all this to be as Thomas says, must there still be a
speoial abstraotive pOWer assigned man?

Could not the possible intelleot

suffioe tor making sensibles intelligible?

Bo.

Beoause these things must

be "made" intelligible; and, it the intelleot were in potenoy to them
before suoh a "making", it oan only be oonoluded that the intelleot, as
potential, does not suffice.

(If the intelligibles proportionate to our

intellect were intelligible in aot the "possible intelleot" would, indeed,
suffioe.)
So that, save for utter materialists and violent Platonists, tew
oould at this stage deny the necessity of some power making man's intelligibles intelligible to him.

But here the agreement neoessarily ends;

there is disoord when the nature of the "performer" of this office is
soughtJ e.g., Augustine's ideas mentioned above.

Now whether the

"intelleotus agens" is God, or a separate substanoe (as some maintained),
or a faculty of the soul is hardly a oontemporary question.

Yet, without

some notioe ot what was once a most bitterly disputed question in philo.ophy, Thomas' teaching on the agent intelleot oannot tully be understood.
(In passing it may be pointed out Thomas' opusoulum De Unitate Intelleotus
was oooasioned by this question.

Cf. also Lattey, St. Thomas, for how the

opposing solution oontravenes faith.)

For the answer to whether the agent

intelleot is a separate substance, or a faoulty of the soul means muoh as
to what its funotions will be.

13

Why should anyone have ever considered the agent intelleot to be a
separate substance?

Speoulation might seem to point to two possible

reasons; one of these is the disdain, bordering on oontempt, with whioh
soze philosophers and philosophies regarded mants bodily "part"; the other
is the very conoeptof intelleotion, whioh would seem to be so high as to
be out of the oontrol of earth-laden man.

But, whatever the truth of what

are at best guesses, there' i. a definite, oonorete reason why Averroes,
Avioenna,' .t.al. did hold their views.

And the paradox, the irony of the

"raison d' ~tre" of their view is that it is based on the same philospher-the fhilosopher--on wham St. Thomas so greatly draws for his noetio.

The

speoial passage on whioh the theory of Thomas' opponents is totally based
(the passage, fram the third book De Anima, aays that the "intelleot as
aotive" ia "aeparatus et immixtus et impassibilis et SUbstantia aotu ena")
is one that he oonours in most wholeheartedly--though, of oourse, itt his,
and not in his opponents' interpretation.
Now there is muoh to be said for sameone's holding suoh viewa--as might
very well be expeoted, oonsidering the oaliber of the men who did espouse
these views.

Fer, not only are AristQtle's reasoning and language far from

pelluoid here, but the four attributes mentioned do seam to apply to
thing preturnatural.

SQme-

St. Thomas himself says that "we must needs observe

that above the intelleotual soul of man we must needs suppose a superior
intelleot, fra. which the soul acquires the power of understanding".4

For

anything--says a oardinal tenet in his philosophy--that is such by participation, that is movable, that is imperfect, always requires the
4

.
Sum. Theol.I,79,4,Resp ••
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pre-existence .f samething essentially such, essentially iMmovable, and
essentially perfect.

Moreover our intelleot

reaohes to the understanding ot truth
by reasoning, and because in those things
~oh it does understand, it passe. traa
potentiality to aot. 6
Likewise, the very relation ot POtenoy to aot leads to thinking the
aotive intelleot separate--"tor the agent is round separate fra. what it
'reduce.' to aot, while that by Which 80mething is in potenoy sesas to be
whelly intrinsio to the thing.,,6
And

80,

many posited a separate active intellect Whioh they oalled an

"intelligenoe".

Its relation t8 man

lVa.S

suoh that "our souls receive fra

it intelligible perfeotions".1 This m.ant--among ether things--that the
phantasm., wbioh are the product of our sensible knowledge, were by this
separate intelligenoe "made fit" for intelleotual cognition.
Adde tr.. considering it talse, what did st. Thomas think of this
argument?

S:e gave his, anewar in the canbat with Slger ot Brabant, and the

Latin AVerroistsJ and this answer--the Gpu8oulua,

De

Unitate lntelleotu8

Oontra Averroistas--ShoWB hi. opinion of such a view, and of it.
proponents.

For this opusoulum i8 almost the olassio example ot the "anger

ot a patient man"a in his reply Aquinas, the "usually placid oontemplative",
oastigates his opponents and even ohallenges them t. meet hia in open
(philosophioal) oombat.

6
i

1

lbid.,1,19,4,~esp ••

De Anima.5,Ae.p ••
Ibid.,5,.ttesp ••

Now the theologioal oonsequenoes of maintaining

15

that man dee. not aot by him.elf must produoe a violent reaotion in any
deep-thinking

theologi~-eBpecially

gaiaing the asoendanoy.

if the embryo heresy .eems to be

xet it is not a8 a thologian that Thomas state.

his opposition to the Arabian theory.
Nor i8 suoh reoourse a neoessity, for. first of all. interpreting
Aristotle is an endeavor anyone may essay. and there is no question that
Thaaas was able to advaooe arguments at least as oonvinoing as those of hi.
opponents.

(Thus he oan say that ".oparate" and "UDIIlixed" merely moan that

"impassible" means there is none of the "loW8r" type of passivity found in
the sonses. yet s ..e sort of passivity towards intelligibles; and that
"it is not r.pugnant to the soul to be in potency even though it is a substanoe in aot".8

Along these same lines he sholl'8 (in the "Contra Gentes.

Bk. Il.0.?8) a possible explanation of Aristotle'. vague wording.)
But the argument is not to be settled by Aristotle. for the truth is
at stake here. and not Aristotle- s wisdom.

Al though they oannot be

thoroughly explored here. there are aotually maQY philosophioal reasons
whioh make a separate intelleot an absurdity.

For instance. the faot that

potenoy aDd aot are proportionate makes it impossible to say that the
possible intelleot. attpart" of the soul. has an aot outside its genus-an aot whioh would make its overy aotion be in very truth "supernatural·.

8

St. Themas 4quinas.

Summa Contra Gentiles.II.?8.
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Likewise man oould hardly be said to exeroise his proper operation, intelleoti on, if this operation dep'ended on an extrinsio principle.

The

oonaequenee of this "WOuld be that man was not any longer "master of his
aotions" J "nor would praise or oondemnation be earnedJ and the whole of
moral soienoe and politioal life would disappear ••• N9
The reason of reasons however, is something muoh more basically
.etaphysioal, and much more distinotiTe of Thomas' teaohing.

For, granted

there be a separate agent intellect, it still is neoe.sary to assign to
the human soul some power partioipating in that superior intelleot, by
whioh power the human soul

~uld

make things to be aotually intelligible.

'.i.'here are, that is to say, seoond oauses.

Such is the oase "in other

perfeot natural things, among whioh, besides the uniTeraal aotiTe oauses,
eaoh one la .-dolVed WJ.th ita proper powers deriTed x'rom those uniTe.. e.l
oauses."lO But among these "sublunary" things nothing i8 more perfect
than the human soul; and so it too must haTe the "suffioient principle"
for its proper operation.
All this we know of oourse, with

experience.

test of all philosophioal truth,

For we peroeiTe that we abstraot uniTersals from their par-

tioular oonditions.
is formally in it".ll
9

~

Now "nothing aots saTe through 80me power

~ich

i.

But both the aotions, that ot the intellect as

Ibid., II,76.

10 Sua. Theol •• I,79,4,Resp ••
11 C .G .. II, 76.
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passive and aa aotive "are man'."
for man abstraots frQJll the phanta8Ill8, and
reoeives into his mind things intelligible •
••• It is necessary therefore, that the
prinoiples to Whioh these aotions are attributed, namely the possible and the agent
intelloot are power Whioh exist in man formally.12
It should also be noted here that, sinoe the aotive intelleot is a power
of the soul, it is not one in all--"for it isimpossible that one and the
13
same power belong to various sUbstanoes".
Therefore no separate substanee does "our thinking for us", although God is the agent intelleot
"where" we get our partioipated power.

(As must, of oourse, be, for,

XhGmas gives even the first prinoiples of
Aristotle'. explanation of thinking an
4ugustinian tinge. Xhe first principles of
understanding in all souls are an image of
truth as found in GodJ they have their
metaphysioal roots in God. In GOd's \nought"
is to be found the ultbaate foundation tf
their infallibility and immutability. 1
Xhus the "intelleotus agens" both is, and is a power of the soul.

Its

suffioient reason is the intelligibility it must find in the phantasms.
But before prooeeding to make out exactly what this last means--and how the
action is acoomplished--it will be profitable to reoall, in general, the
relations between the aotive and the possible intellects.

(In doing so a

01a8sioal objeotion will be adverted to, namely "that it is impossible for
a possible and an aotive intelleot to oome together in the one substance,
the soul.")

fiow the one and same substance, the human soul, is in potency

12 Ibid.,II,7ti.
13 Sum.Theol •• I,79,6,Resp ••
14 Marta Grabmann. "Die Philosophie des Mittelalters" in Samm.l.ung
Gosihen. Bd.826,192l,94.
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to all intelligiblea--"through" the possible intellect--and makes the.ate
be in act--nthrough" the aotive intellect) and this seems t. be completely
oontradiotory since both are rooted in the same soul.
The dittioulty however. Thomas holds to be really only a verbal one)
tor he Say8 there ia aotually nothing torbidding something'. being "in one
way in potenoy and in another in aot. as we see in natural

thin~sJ

tor air

i8 aotually moist. but potentially dry. whereas the opposite is true ot
earth. l5

This relation i. tound between the intelleotual soul and the phan-

ta8ma ••• ntor the intellective part stands in such a relation to the phantasa
that in one

~

it is in potency to them. aDd ia another way is aotual in

respeot ot them. n16

For the intelleotual soul has something to ~oh the

phantasa is in potency. and vioe versa.

The soul has intellectuality.

tBaateriallty. but does not trom this have that it oan assimilate "to this
or that determined thing."

Meanwnile, these deter.mined natures ot sensible

things are the Tery essenoe ot the phantas..

A meeting. then, in this

oontext i . impossible, beoause the phantasms are "s1miltudes ot sensible
things. but in a material way."11

And theretore. it--as there must

oertainly be--there is to be suoh a meeting (one uniting the potential
intelligibility and

the~tual

determination ot the phantasms with the

epposite characteristios in the intelleotual soul as potentially knowing),
15 O.G. II. 11.
1& De. Sp. Oreat. 10, ad 9.
11 O.G.II. 17.
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there 1. required 1n the soul a "pow.r Which can actively work '1n' the
phantasms, making them intelligible 1n act."lS
Theretore the intellectual soul stands in relation to the phantasms
as both act and potency, but it must not be thought that the relation i .
the same as that tound in natural agents; tor in them one is 1n potency
to another "acoording to the same mode in wnich it is tound in the other,"
(tor the matter ot air is in potency to the torm ot water as it is at
present in the water).

This is nct--and this is the toundation ot what

is to tollo.--the case in the soul; tor it is not in potency the same way
as the.e are "in" the phantasms.

It this were the oase, there would be no

need ot an active, an abstractive, intelleot.

The soul, theretore, can

only be 1n potency to the phantasms according as they are in same way
brought to its level; as they are--in the usual phraseology--made
intelligible in act by being "abstracted" tram individual material oonditions.
There remains yet one more "disputed question" in regard to the agent
intellect.

It is a partlnioh, on exploration, seems to have been toolishly

upheld by non-Thomistio philosophers.

It is a point Which would again

serve to make ot the "intellectus agens" a separate substanoe; or it not
this, then at least ohange its nature radically.

But again, it is a

pOint that can be maintained by anyone.th a bias) tor the basis ot it is
the third book De Anima.

Here, as noted betore, there is an open tield

tor "commentating", since Aristotle's language is tar tres unaabiguous.
Apparently speaking ot the "intelleotus agens n , he says (III De Anima,
cap. V, 2, 430 a) -it does not at one time understand something, and at

18 Ibid.
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another time not".

Thi. is, of oourse, samething that oannot be said of

the human soul, in which there is nothing that always under.tands.

Thua,

if this ia what Ari8totle says, and if he is to be truly taken a8 the
Philosopher, there oan be no answer given the argument.
Thomas' answer is that

~

is not v.hat Aristotle had said, and here

hi. case i. muoh more oonvincing than the previous one, thus eltainating
the horrible neoessity ot saying again that truth, and not what Aristotle
.aid, is the objeot ot philosophy.

Aooording to him, 4ristotle "at first

began speaking of the possible intelleot, and afterwards of the agent
intelleot, and then began to oonsider the intelleot in aot, Where he say.
'Aotual knowledge i8 identioal with its objeot, and he distinguished the
intelleot in aot from the pos8ible intelleot in three 1V8.y.... l9
(III

De

Anima, oap J.V and XU).

Here, then is what is of the Tery essenoe or hi. philosphy.
ha8 oonsidered the intelleot

tr~

Aristotle

ita aotual and from its potential aspeots.

However, here the distinotion is not one in relation to the phantama, to
the aotual acquiring ot knowledge) but is rather the intelleot a8 the
"tabula rasa" and as aotually knowing.
at all in question as was above assumed.

Here the "agent intelleot" is not
The agent intelleot aotually has

nothing to do with this question \ even though it i8 the means whereby an
intelleot may be "knowing") J tor the "intelleot as aotive" neither is in
potency to intelligibles to know them, nor does it, it. work being finiahed,
"know" (never does it ·~under8tand").

19

De Sp. Cr. X, ad 3.
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The tirst ot the threetold distinctions betwwen the intellect as
possible and the "intellect ia aota is that"the pos.ible intelleot is
not the thing understood,,120
understood.

whereas the "intellect in aot" is the thing

The seoond is in showing the order between the intelleot as

possible and the "intelleot in aot"; i.e. "in one and the same thing the
intellect is tirst in potency betore it i8 in aot, not however simply,
a8 it i8 often right to say this ot those things wnioh pass trem potenoy
to act."21

Finally, he makes the above statement ooncerning "al waY8

understandingii, as the great ditterence between theee two "intellects".

tor the possible intelleot is possible beoause it does not understand
aotually, whereas "the intellect is made to be in aot by the taot that it
'beoomes' the very intelligibles."22
Immediately

tcllo~ng

this distinguishing, Aristotle now adds

"separatum autem hoc solum quod vere est".

This could only have been said

ot the "intellect in act", tor the agent intelleot and the possible
intellect he had called "separate", but individually.

It remains, then,

that this statement is made
about that which comprehends both, namely
the intelleot in act ••• tor that only in
our soul oan be called separate--not using
an organ--and this is proper to the intellect in aot; that is, that part ot the
soul by Whioh "We understand in act; and it
oomprehends the possible and the agent
intellects, 23

20 Ibid.
21 De.An. 5, ad 1
22 O.G.II, 18.
23 Ibid.
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and thus he add. that "this alone ot the soul is immortal and perpetual,"
because it does not depend on the body; it is separate.
There are these three "intellects" to be remembered. the possible
intellect•• "possible" to knowing at all; the agent intellect, Which is the
quaai-instrument tor producting knowledge by "working on the only material.
whioh oould give knowledge in man's present state; and the "intellect in
aot", the intellect knowing, the intelleot as beoome the object ot
knowledge.

CHAPTER V
LANGUAGE DIl"FICULTIES
The problem then has been delineated, yet it will be found that

.

actually far fram all has been said.

To say that the human intellect

must have the ability for making its objects of knowledge intelligible
in act is, it is true, to solve a general problem, but it is, at the
same time, to create a host of Itdetail" problems.

For it is now to be

asked how this rapprochement between sensible and intellectual knowledge
is brought about.

Granted that "both intellection and phantasm are

processes, not things,,,l it still remains to ask how these processes are
made to meet.
Now it i8 clear that, in relation to the possible intellect, this
fusion will effectively be the work of the "agent intellect". for though
for cognition "besides the presence of the active intellect we require the
pre.ence of phantasms, the good disposition ot the sensitive powers, and
practice in this sort of operation," 2 the phantasm, the architectonic
summation ot sensations, eto.--is actually only the matter ot the cause ot
3
knowledge.
The phanta8Jll is an instrument ot the aotive intellect. 4Dd
only a higher power could make this summation in any way what,oever etteot
man's preper power, the intelleot.

I

Sr. Mary Anastasia Coady. The Phanta.. Aooording to TeaOhint ot St.
Thomas. Catholio University Press., waShington, b.o., 1932, •
2
Sua. Theol., I, 79, 4, ad S.

3 St. Thomas Aquinas, Quodl1betales, VIII, 3.
23
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the "how" ot it still raaains, and poses the dittioulties whioh must
be enoountered by all oonsidering the problea.

But for

~t.

Thomas the

problea is even more diffioultJ tor the question asks, in effeot, that the
tangential point of two hierarohioal orders--the sensible and intelleotual-be disoovered.

But the problea for those Who would follow Thomas is more

diffioult still; for their master, in what i8 probably his most explioit
statement of the relation existing between phantasm and intelleot

(~

Theol. I, 84, 7, Reap.) in "the employaent of metaphor ••• leaves hi.
intended meaning net altogether olear."4
Thus in his exposition of the topio, not only in the passage cited,
but in all others, such terms as "illuminare", "inspioere", "illustrare"
and "lumen" abound.

It will be the task here, therefore, to attempt to

look behind these mataphors, and, in so doing, assay--if possible--a
literal explanation ot the four functions of the agent intelleot which are
veriliable in the writings of st. Thomas.

(The very namenolature used in

desoribing these funotions exhibits this metaphorioal oharaoter, viz.,
"illumining· the phantasm, "abatraoting"'the intelligible speoies,
"strengthening" the possible intelleot, and "making evident" first prinoiples.)
Sinoe there is no guarantee--nor indeed even a strong indioation-that such oan be done, and sinoe the above seems to indioate at least some
sort ol disapprobation of the method Aquinas used, it may be well to

4 Coady, 1.
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oonsider here What the use of the metaphor involves.

Wow St. Thomas has

been roundly and frequently oritioized for his use of metaphor (as wall,
of oourse, on the contrary ohar!. of laoking imagination), as if this were
peculiar t. him alone among those who seek truth.

(The point is a barren

ene, but it may 'Well be pointed out that one whom most worship as a
philosopher, William James, makes his psyohology as interesting a8 a literary essay by reason of his popular metaphorioal style.)

This is

oertainly not the case, but, granted his use of metaphor, the Angelio
Doctor is at least consistent with his view that "everything we know in our
present state is known as a 'oomparison' to sensible natural things • .,5
We thu8 use the same 'WOrds which depiot the physioal world outside us to
desoribe the psyohioal or spiritual world within (as "broad" interpretation,
"fertile" imagination, "oearse" manners, et al.)--"when we will to

under~

stand something we propose to ourselves sensible example. out ot Whioh
images oan be formed which help in understanding. ltS
The point to be kept in mind always is that metaphorioal langu.ge in
no way neoessarily involves obtuscation.

And if there be danger, it is one

that oannot be avoided; for the things are innumerable whioh oannot be
aoourately defined or desoribed by words, whioh are, after all, only sensible
signs.

On the other hand, however, there is the faot that analogy

and

metaphor, it used with due measure and oaution, furnish a method of investigation and help to the progress of thought which is exoeedingly usetul.

5 Sum. Theol., I, 84, 8, Resp.
S Ibid., I, 84, 7, Hesp.
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And there oan be no doubt that these were the motives behind st.
Thomas' figurative language.

With him the employment of either analogy

or metaphor was but an attempt to express in terms ot experienoe thoughts
lying beyond our experience; to express the abstraot in terms ot the
oonorete; to pioture forth the unfamiliar by means ot the tamiliar; t.
express super-sensible thought by terms

~ioh

express the sensible.

Thus.

for instanoe. "illuminare". "lumen". "lux" do illustrate and elucidate
manta act ot understandiag.

So. it analOgy of proportion and analogy ot

attribution are given plaoe' in philosophy. the same privilege must be
aocorded metaphor; for the use of metaphor is implioitly a reasoning tram
analogy.

And

SO

nit mast not be thought that the question ot the "lumen

intellectuale" is a pure dialeotic
this were

80.

discuss~on

ot a metaphor.

Even it

a correct solution would still be imperative sinoe metaphors

have a oertain well-defined relation to the faot whioh oannot be ignored. n1

1

Bdward F. Talbot. Knowledge and Objeot.
Washingt.n. D.C., 1932. 65.

Oatholio University Press ••

ClW'TER VI
FUNC'rIONS OF THE "INTELLECTUS AGENS"

The first of the funotions of the "intelleotus agens" mentioned above
also ranks first in its use of metaphor.

But neither of these "firsts" is

the reason why the fUnotion will be oonsidered first here.

For, granted

the stiaulktions of sensory organs transmitted to the brain, and the
resul tant "phantasm tl , the next step towards beooming intelleotually oognoscible must be what st. Thomas is pleased to call "illwaination".

The real

process of abstraction i8 the generation of intelligible speoies, "but the
illumination of the phantasm, the act of making it aotually intelligible
preoedes abstraotion and ~.nders it possible."l
posite sensible life in general is ennobled by it.

Just as in the human
unio~

OOB-

with the supersen-

sible, so also the sensible representations, the phantasas, reoeive trGm
their union with the faoulty of spiritual knowledge an aptitude or a
disposition so that the intelligible speoies can be "abstraoted" from them.
And for a better understanding of suoh a prooess there was, in Thomas'
time, no better ooaparison available than that ot material light.

And

inde.d, one would be hard-pressed better to express what is being oonveyed
in other than this manner.

This oan be seen in Thamas' explanation ot

how the oomparison is to be applied.

1 Ooady, Sr. Mary Anastasia. The Phantasm. AoooZ"~ to Teaohi~ of
St. Thomas, Catholio University Press., Washi~ton, D.C., 1932, 52.
21

28

It must be that oorporeal images are applied
to spiritual things by a oertain similitude,
whioh is indeed a similitude ot proportionality ••• for ~ight· as applied t. spiritual
things is that Whioh makes tor an intelleotual
manitesting, just aa oorporeal light maniteats
sensible reality. 2
There were two theories ot the nature of light in vogue in the thirteenth century (of. I, 79, 3, ad 2).3

One theory regarded light neoessary

for sight inasmuch as it made color aotually visible, it was light Which
gave visibility to oolors.

But this opinion was not Aristotle's.

He

rather taught that, while light was necessary for sight, its funotion was
not to give visibility to colors, but to make the medium through wnich the
oolor passed luminous "in aotu"--and thus oapable of transferring the
oolor fran the objeot to the sense organ.
St. Thomas used for his analogy.

It was this latter theory that

And so, as figures and oolors are always

found in bodies, but can only be seen it light rays fallon the bodies,
so the object of the intellectual representation, i.e., the quiddity, is
really in the thing; but, in order tor that essence to be perceived by the
soul, it has to be separated fram the material conditions Which aooompany
it in the individual.

Now that separation does take place when the

immaterial power of the soul "turns toward" the sensible representationJ
it is through the union with the spiritual light that the essence "hidden"
under sensible phenomena reveals itself to the intelligence.
this aot of the "intellectus agens" transcends

any

And sinoe

operation familiar to

our experience, St. Thomas, for want of a better illustration likens tho
prooess to an "illumination" of the phantasms.

But whatever be the nature

of this operation, it produces a result as illuminating to the intellect

~

as Aquinas. In II Sent., d. 13, a.2.
St. aff:son's
interaetiug diioussion of "light"
1
St.• Bonaventure,

~1l

et seq.

in The Philosophy
of st.
_

29
as

li~ht

falling upon oolor does to the eye.

A modern illustration of this--itself about to beoaae ola.sioal--is
that of the X-ray.

For. Wben oathode rays enter matter. the latter not

only fluoresoes. but also emits an entirely new kind of radiation.

TheBe

rays also have the startling property of penetrating media that are
opaque to ordinary light.

Here there is a fine simile between the working.

of the material X-rays and the immaterial "intelleotus agens", tor. just
as the former separatea, as it were. bones from flesh in the hand (ldthout
produoing any ohange in the hand), 80, too, the latter separates the
universal trom the partioular existing in the phantasm (and. in ita turn,
leaves the phantasm unohanged).
(There are, however, in this oomparison of the aotion of physioal
light to that of the "lumen intelleotuale", 80me very important differenoes.
Thus, in the physical theory the oolors are visible "in aotu", independent
of the action of the light; the aotive intellect by its light however.
makes the phantasms Whioh were intelligible only in potenoy. intelligible
in act.

Moreover, the phantasm does not determdne the possible intelleot

in the same way that color determines sight; nor does the light of the
agent intelleot act directly on the P088ible intellect as physical light
acts on the senae organ.

The phantasm is acted upon by the light of the

aotive intelleot, and thu8 intellectual light is really not fooused in any
way on the possible intelleot. but Wbolly upon the phanta...4

The

re8ult--although this is to anticipate--is that the intellect as possible
receives. not illumination. but the intelligible speoies illumined by the
"intellectu8 agens".)
4 Edward F. Talbot. Knowledge and Object.
Washington. D.C., 1932, 68.

Catholio University Pre.s.
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This point must be emphasized, namely, that in this illumination, just
as in the oase of the X-ray'. effeot on it. matter, there is no ohange made
in the phantasm.

There is no modification effeoted in the phantasm by the

illuminating power of the "intel1eotus agens" aooording to St. Thomas.
The phantama originated, and must ever remain in the imagination--and this
permanenoe must also apply to its makeup.

All that the agent intellect

does is to make it intelligible, and in so doing, affeots the image no more
than any objeot is affeoted by throwing a light on it.
in the texts of

Thoma~

There is nothing

that indioates any sort of modifioation other than

that Whioh the possible intelleot participates in.

The aot of the

"intelleotu8 agens" is to separate the universal from the yartioular without
affeoting the partioular; just a8 we can oonsider oolor in, or separate
from an apple without affeoting that apple. 6

The form in the phantasm is

not transferred physioally from the imagination intc the possible intel1eot. 6
A8 the figures and oolors of a body merely beoome visible to -the eye when
light falls upon the objeot, and as the light is the medium by whioh these
features of the object impress our sight, so the sensible representations
are aot transferred from the phantasy to the possible intelleot.

Thus it

i. that, not these representations, but the power of the soul called the
"active intellect" whioh will be seen to produoe the intelligible species
in the possible intelleot. 7

5 Sum. Theel., I, 85, 1, ad 1.
S Ibid. I, 85, 1, ad 3.
7 Ibid. I, 86, 1, ad 4.
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All this, however, is not so potently obvious as stated here.

For,

as was above stated, St. Thomas did not very explioitly show the relation
.f phantaaa and intelleot, and hence did not show what all was involved in
saying that phantasms are "illumined".

Such a oondition, naturally, drew

a host of oommentators and oommentaries, all of Whom would interpret
"ad mentem divi

Thoma~ft.

411 agree on what Thomas had said, viz., that

the phantasms "are an instrument of the agent inteileot," but, "they are
muoh divided in explaining in wnat manner it is an inatrument."S
In apparently the only attempt he made to indioate what "illuminat"
was, St. Thomas seems to indioate that this "lighting up" 1s a formal one
(i.e., "through the inherenoe of light in the 'illuminated' subjeot: 9
Saying this oal18 for some spiritual power or light to be derived fram the
'intelleotus agens' in erder that the phantasms might be lighted up in a
formal manner". 10 Unexpeotedly enough, this view is not the same as that
of most of Thomas' great oommentators for oomment is needed on this topio
Whioh Thomas did not amplify to muoh extent.

Thu8 Cajetan, for instanoe,

states that the "intellectus agens" operates "in" the phantasms, not
through a "formal," but an objective illumination,

~ioh

he oonsidered

enough to show that the phanta... did in some way ooncur in producing the
intelligible species.

An objeotive illumination is ine in

~ioh

an objeot

is made apparent through the assistance of some extrinsio light ••• and in

8

John of St. Thomas. Cursus Phil080phiou8 Thomisticus Naturali. Naturalis
Philosophiae., IV Pars, Q X, a. 2.
9 C.G., II, 77.
10 John of St. Thomas, X, 4.
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this the 'light' is said to inhere. not in the objeot lighted. but in the
medium of vid bili ty. 1111

4nother 1l1.terpretation is that

or

Sylveater

l"errariensia. who thought that phantasms were "illuminated" neither formally nor objeotively. but only "radioally," inasmuoh as the phantaama are
'rooted' in the same spiritual soul as is the agent intelleots and thus
this oommon souroe is suffioient to produoe 'illuminated' phantasms, i.e.,
phantasms whioh are oonditioned already so that the agent intelleot oould
abstraot from them a speoies (and this 'oonditioning' renders the phantamn
intelligible in aot)."12

Finally, there is the opinion of othera who,

like Rubio, hold tlthatthe agent intelleot lights up the phantasms by
reason of the intelligible speoies, in w.hioh alone is the objeot rendered
intelligible in aot, Whioh was only potentially intelligible in the
phantasms." 13
Now it was already shown that there oan be no modifioation of the
phantasm aooording to St. Thomas.

It was also seen that the material phan-

tasm oannot, as suoh, affeot the possible intellect.

It must be in line

with these two principles, then, that same judgment be made of the several
above views on what "illumination" is.

Thus it appears that it oan be said

ot the "radioal" illustration, or illumination, that it forgets these two
prinoiples) for, trom this tlbei:cg rooted in", it does not seem that the
phantasm and its aotion do not reoeive any immateriality, or any power

11

Ibid., X, 4.
12Ibid'-, X, 4.
13Ibid., X, 4.
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exceeding the corporeal and material nature, for is not the soul

(as was

shown previously) the remote principle even of processes Which take place
in corporeal organs!

Sinee the soul is the form of the Whole body, every

fUnotion ot man--conscious or unoonscious--is "psyohical".

But are we

then to conolude that every function of man is a spiritual one?
is, of course, that suoh a oonolusion is Obviously false.

The answer

But then, how is

it to be maintained that ~at is certainly not a spiritual aotion (namely,
that prooess involving the phantasy), Oan be oalled spiritual on only this
basis, namely, that it is--as is the agent intellect--somehow rooted in
the soulT

Certainly a oommon souroe does not say that the two elements in-

volved are "habilitated" for somehow acting on eaoh other.
Therefore, if there is only this "radical habilitation", this "rooting"
must either have in it something ot spirituality {and hence destroy the
nature of the phantasm), or else the same difficulty obtains as before,
viz., how the material can affect the immaterial.

And thus it seems impos-

sible that Thomas' theory of how the active intellect affects the phantasms
is to be found in this interpretation.
Nor is the idea of a formal illumination totally adequate.
illumining of this sort seems also to violate the prinoiples on
true interpretation must be based.

For an
~ich

a

Again it must be recalled most emphat-

ically that a phantasm is an image and is, as such, particular. it is by
definition oorporeal.

And, although it must in 80me way be a partial source

of intelligibility, it oan itself be no more than intelligible in potency.
~f,

then, we are to say that the active intelleot formally illumines the

phantasms \if some light "inheres in" the pha.ntasm) and thus makes

~
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int.lligible, we in effeot destroy the phantasm.

Any suoh immutation of

the phantasm oannot but deny the exolusively potential intelligibility of
this image.

:.Lhus the action of the "intelleotus agens;' on the phantasm

oannot be of this "formal" natu,' ••
aor does it seem that uajetan!s solution oan avail; for although it
seems that, unlike the previous

ex~ple,

no intrinsio mutation takes

plaoe--only an extrinsic assistance being given--, suoh a ohange aotually
seems unavoidable.

For this extrinsio assistanoe--this illumination of

the medium. of "visibility"--either serves to make the objeot intelligible
in the phantasm, or not; if not, then, of oourse, the phantasm is potentially intelligible, just as it was before the "illumination".

While if

some suoh effeot is, on the other hand, had, its term is either in the
phantasm (and thus there is a "formal" illumination)--whioh, sinoe it would
oonstitute an intrinsic immutation, Cajetan most emphatioally denies; or
else in the pOssible intelleot--but this latter effeot would be the very
"impressed intelligible speoies" in whose forming he seeks the part played
by the phantasm; or else--and finally--in something joined to the phantasm
(as air is diffused around a oolored objeot).

But this last, while it

seems plausible, is as unaooeptable as the other alternatives, since the
po-wer derived from the "intellectus agens" is spiritual and "cannot be more
diffused through a corporeal thinr, than in that very phantasm whioh is its
subject, which itself is corporeal nl4 ; so that the spiritual illumination

14

Ibid., X, 4.
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actually has illuminated nothing.

Hence, though there must be some etteot

produoed by the spiritual light of the intellect remaining in the

phanta~,

Cajetants solution cannot serve to explain it.
In the faoe of this last failure it is well to recall again the two
prinCiples upon Which a valid interpretation of what st. Thomas calls
"illumination" oan be made.

These two oonditions are rooted in the very

natures of things; on the nature of the phantasm, and on the relations--if
any--wnioh are possible between the material and the immaterial (spiritual).
Now a phantasm is a material image whioh comes to be as the culmination of
sensible knowledge; it is the "summation" of sensible notes which expresses
the thing known in its most complete sensible "form."
But a phantasm is only material; any intelligibility it purely potential intelligibility.

And in thisls the orux of the problem.

For the

knowledge of man as man must be the knowledge oonsequent on mant s highest
power; i.e., it must be intelleotual knowledge.

Now all knowledge oomes

in some way from the senses and ultimately from the phantaSDl.

But how is

this possible; how oan the material phantasm affect an immaterial faoulty?
From this oonsideration then are the two principles mentioned abOTe
derivable.

For it must be said that the material oaunot affect the immater-

ial; but it must also be said that the phantasm, if it is to remain Buoh,
oannot suffer any modifioation whioh would destroy its nature.
Now in order that "illumination" be possible of definition, it remains
to see what St. Thomas has said about the one of the solutions above
advanced which has not yet been oonsidered.

This yet unoritioized view of
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"illumination" is one that does nots.em to involve rendering the
knowable object intelligible in the phantasm itself.

But it does say that

the phantasm is somehow "used" by the "intellectus agens" as an instrument
elevated by it "to the production of a spiritual and intelligible species"
in which the object is first of all represented in an immaterially intelligible mode--thus not violating--at least at first glance--the two "regula".
But is this so!

Does this not involve What has been vehemently

vetoed up till now, i.e., a corporeal instrument's producing a spiritual
effect!

Although difficult of explication, this can be denied; and the

palliation here is that the corporeal instrument is "elevated by a spiritual power".

Now that suoh is a possibility in the philosophy (and

theology) of st. Thomas is truly ineluotable; for instance, fire. elevated
by God, can apparently torture a spiritual substance; likewise, sacraments-material beings--cause grace in the soul.

And the reason for the possi-

bility is equally inescapable, granted Thomas' thought.

For the union of

spirit and matter in man is "for the perfecting of the intellect itself."
It is therefore fitting that things corporeal should be subordinate to the
spiritual in the formation of that Whioh pertains to the perfection of
intellect--here, the "impressed speoies".

And thus, as the virtue of the

artificer is determined by the knife to producing a sharp incision, and
the instrument, in turn, by the artifioer, so that the incision be of such
kind; so is the power of the active intellect determined by the phantasm
"80

that the species of such (tale) an object or quiddity be elicited."

And the phantasm, from the motion and elevation of the "intellectus agens"
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i8 now used to produoe a species representing in an immaterial mode, and
without the conditions of matter, the quiddity of the object to be known.
We might 8till ask if all this is not gratuitous.
brought forth to show it is nott

Can texts be

If the actual words of st. Thomas sub-

stantiating this particular possibility be sought, they can be found in
the

ans~r

to the fourth objeotion of the first artiole, question eighty-

five, in the

~rima

Pars."

Here Aquinas pOints out that the agent

intellect's power is in respect of the phantasma, but abstraction is in
respect of the speoies.

But, since there is no intelligibility in aot

without abstraotion, it would be absurd to say that the phantasms are made
intelligible in themselves.

The "illumination" is thus not one of 80me

immaterial perfeotion being somehowplaoed in the

phanta~.

rather, it

oonsists only in rendering the phantasm8 "habilia" for the "extraotion"
of the intelligible speoies.
Now, lest this be thought to be the same general position as the one
oonsidered above, it must be said that the "habilitaa" oonoluded to here
is not something "radioale" in the phantasms, sinoe "they" are said to be
"habilitated" by the power of the intelleot "as aotive"--not as the
inevitable oondition of being rooted in the soul.

But this power, it must

be understood, is not the root of the phantasms (the soul is). and so
posits in them not something "radioale", but "actuale"; and therefore
"oannot be anything else but some moving or impression by which the phantasms are moved and subordinated to the agent intelleot; and thus in the
same way an axe is by art made able to produot artefacts, so is the
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phantasz made an instrument able to produoe speoies."l6

It is for this

reason that St. Thomas oan oall the "intelleotus agens" an "artl.t" and
the phantasm an "instrument".lS
Thus then does st. Thomas explain illumination.

One might well

question whether this i8 an explanation; but it sesns that this is all
Thomas has to say on the matter.

Admittedly there remains muoh to be said;

for an "elevation" of the phantasm to a position wnere it oan be used as
an "instrument for the production of species" still leaves what Maritain
oalls "mystery."

Yet What could there be but mystery wnen there ia any

question of any sort of relation between the material and the spiritual
orders?

If knowledge is an aoquisition of "being," why should the mystery

in which "being" is shrouded be thought to be absent?
How--it was also asked (and answered)--can the same intelleot be
conoeived olearly by us as being both passive and active?

And the answer

to this is also the answer to how the Hintelleotus agens" "prepares"
(by illumination) the phantasm so that it might from it produce an intelligible speoies.

That answer is that the case in each is one involving a

metaphysical necessity.

Surely the potentially intelligible source (and

the onlz souroe) of root intellectual knowledge must be somehow tmade t
aotually intelligible.
be

80

And as

l~

as it be remembered that this oan only

on the basis of the two above-mentioned prinoiples, it must also be

admittea that only this solution of Thomas oan--of all the others mentioned-be aooepted.
15

Ibid., X, 4.
16 St. Thomas Aquinas. De Veritate,

X.a of. also Quodlibet. VIII, 3.
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Hewever, this may perhaps be better understood when it 1s noted that
illumination is neither the sole work of the agent intelleot, nor i.
illumination the only element in reduoing potential intelligibility to aotual intelligibility.

For having completed its work of "illumining" the

phantaaa--using again here, statio, substantial terms for

~t

is in faot,

a prooesa--the aotive intellect proceeds to oarry out its second major
funotion in the aoquisition of knowledge the abstraoting of the intelligibile speoies.

An understanding of this funotion is as difficult of attain-

ment as that of the previous function--though here there is probably a
better image to be formed of the prooess than in the previous case.

Yet the

diffioulty is great--or perhaps more so, due to the use of images for Wbat
is a metaphysical pOint.

But the attempt will be rewarding as well, for

"the key to St. Thomas" theory of oognition is the abstraotion of the
'apecies intelligib1lis' tr .. the phantaaRJ but in truth it seems diffioult
to find the look."17

A beginning oan
itself.

be made by oonsidering what abstraotion involves in

For st. Thomas it may oocur in tw. ways; first by way of oomposi-

tion and division, and "thus

M

understand that one thing does not exist in

80.e other, or that it is separate from it"J l8 seoondly, by way of a simple
and absolute consideration, and "thus we understand one thing without oonsidering another. n19

Therefore, for the intelleot to abstraot from one

17
J. L. McKenzie. "Abstraction in i)t. Thomas". Modern Schoolman, IX, 1934.
18 Sum. Theol., I, 85, 1, ad 1.
19 Ibid., I, 85, 1, ad 1.
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another, things wnich are not really abstraoted from eaoh other would imply
falsehood in the first of these modes above; while in the seoond mode suoh
a prooedure is perfeotly in order and involves no falsehood.

t'or, if it

were said that color is not in a oolored object, or that it were separate
fram it, there would be error in What was said or thought.

Hewever, if the

oolor and its properties are oonsidered without reference to the subject
they are in, there is nothing amiss; for any particular colored objeot is
not easential to oolor, and thus oolor oan be understood independently of
"hoc· object.
In the same way, the things Which belong to the species of a material
thing oan be oonsidered without considering the individual principles
which do not belong to the notion of the speoies.

this, then, is what is

meant by abstraoting the universal trom the partioular, or the intelligible speoies from the phantasm.

In ether words, this is to oonsider the

nature of the speoies apart from the individual notea as presented in the
phantasm.
this last is, of oourse, that abstraction which is the agent intellect's
seoond function.

Dut again, the matter is far from as olear a8 might seem

from oursorily reading

th~

above sentenoes.

uddly enough, however, the

reason for muoh of the obtuscation is not in the dootrine itself.

True

enough, knowledge is far fram being a prooess easy of explanation.

And

the prooess of abstraotion, the very foundation of What oan be oalled
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Thomas' noetio, must more than share ia this disability.

But the darknes8

here truly is not sO muoh from the almost unfathomable depths of thought
on an almost unfathomable problem whioh the mind of an Aquinas can lead,
but rather is it from the multitudinous misinterpretations with Which his
explanations have been burdened.
The aotual point in question here i8 that lithe species of a material
thing can be considered without considering the individual prinoiples
whioh do not belong to the notion of the species."

This formula "formerly

signified the taking up of something; now it 'WOuld signify the negleot of
something."20

Thus, at present, as the mere oonsideration of the mere

oonsideration of the word would oonsoiously indioate to everyone, the idea
i8 "to be rid of

something",~

matter--Whioh last involves an even greater

error, since matter i8 not to be abstraoted away in the knowing of a
material objeot.

Suoh connotations, then, are not "ad ment .. divi Thaaae",

and are far from giving abstraotion the exalted meaning he does--ratherls
this new view almost purely a negative one.
For, as defined by Thomas, abstraction was the "taking up of the essence
by the intelleot; it was an elevation of the essenoe to the level of intel1eot".21

In no sense was it oonoeived of as the disoovery of a "new point

of view" J for a "aew point of view would still have as its objeot and end
the phantasm of an individual object.

It could never attain that higher

20 lI. )(aher. Psyohology, Empirioal and Hational.
1900, 307.
21 Ibid., 307.

Longmans, Green Co.,
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IPhere of activity in whioh the essence 1smade evident."22

Therefore,

for any iuvestigation of this second function of the active intellect the
correct meaning cf the word itself must be constantly kept in mind.
In abstraction two causes must be considered as finally produotive
of the intelligible speoies in the "intellect as possible."

The "intellec-

tus agens" i. the cause insofar as it renders the object intelligible in
act.

The phantasm is the cause insofar as, in virtue of this principle

oause, it furnishes the essence of a determined object to be oognized.
St. Thomas charaoterizes the relationship by saying that the phantasm is
the instrumental cause of the intelligible speoies--in that reoeiving in
which the possible intellect aoquires the species of things, the phantasms
act as a secondary~d instrumental cause"23 (while the agent intellect is
the prinoiple and primary cause").

Thus the intelligible speoies is "in"

the ·possible intelleot as oonditioned by both and not by one only".3
And thus, sinoe neither the aotive intellect, nor the phantasa, alone are
suffioient for such a speoies, it must be said that "intelligible forms
in act do not exist as such either in the phantasm or in the agent intellect,
but 801ely in the possible intellect. n25

22
23
24
25

Talbot, 71.
St. Thomas Aquinas. De Veritate., X, 6, ad 7.
Ibid., X, 6, ad 7.
Ibid., X, 6, ad 7.
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But

~at

is this oaused thing, this intelligible speoies?

It ia not

aD

overly mysterious thing, however oooult be the manner in wnieh it "enters"
the mind.

It is amply the nature of an objeot ooaidered in itself without

regard to the material oonditions in whioh it exists.

The objeot is intel-

ligible .ow, beoause, although it does not--and oannot--exist as

~terial,

it is oonsidered without the conditions of its matter, it is abstraotively
immaterial.
But it may be asked--along with the host of not striotly pertinent
questions whioh the matter aDove iuvites--how an abstraotion from matter
oould even be oonsidered possible.

For the essenoe of a material objeot

is a material essenoe, and, unless one means to say, for instanoe, that, in
knowing man he oan know man's soul "apart" from man's body, then it oannot
apparently be said that the form is abstraoted from the matter.

It would

thus seem that this funotion of abstraoting is truly a metaphorioal one.
But this i8 to forget one most important point, viz., that a material objeot,
"qua" material, oannot, abetraotion omitted, be ectually intelligible to an
immaterial faoulty.
The oomplete reply to suoh an objeotion will serve not only to answer
the objeotien, but to indioate preoisely What happens when an "abstraction"
i8 made from "illumined" or "prepared" phantasm.

The reply is a quotation

from the Summa Theologica, and, While lengthy, it is indispensable for an
under~tanding

of Thomas' thought on the subjeotl
matter is Wofeld, common and 'signate',
or individual, oommon, suoh as flesh and
bone, individual, suoh as this flesh and
these bones. The intelleot therefore
abstraots the speoies of a natural thing
from the individual sensible matter, but
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not from the oommon sensible matter. For
example, it abstracts the speoies of 'man'
fram 'this flesh and these bones', whioh
de not belong to the species as such, but
to the individual, and need not be considered in the speoies. But the species ot
man cannot be abstraoted by the intelleot
trom 'flesh and bones.,26
The point, then, is that in its second function the tlintelleotus
agens" does not abstract tram matter, but tram material determinations.
In cognizing some objeot via this Uabstraction" which is productive ot
that object's intelligible species, the form is not abstracted as pure
and selt-subsisting--this would be an error--but as a material principle,
the act of an individual material object deter.mining that object to be
what it is (matter is suoh and is known as suoh only through its aotualization by the form).
Now here, as in his statements on illumination, Thomas stops his
analysis of abstraotion.

And as in the previous case he does stop at the

"mystery"; he does stop at that point where there must be same sort of
interaction between the material and the immaterial.

lhe phantasm has

been tlprepared"--via illumination--so that it might be "made" in same way
the source of actual intelligibility.

Hut for actual intelligibility

there must be more than preparation; there must be this process oalled
abstraction, for it is through this that the intelligible species is
produced.

And the point here is again the "must". for we are faced here

again with a metaphysioal necessity.

26 Sum. Theol., I, 85, 1, ad 2.
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How the possible intelleot is, as the re. lt of illumination and
abatraction, .nabled to "see" the essence, enoased in matter--for st.
Thomas does say that the essence is known in the phantasm--is as diffioult
to clearly know as how the phantasm was originally "elevated" to this
state.

Certainly it oan be said the "elevation"must be continuous.

But

just as oertainly must it be said that the phantasm must not be destroyed
as to its materiality; and that the phantasm as suoh oannot affeot an
immaterial faoulty suoh as the possible intelleot.

So that it oan only be

oonoluded--more definite texts on the matter being unavailable--that the
phantasm is "raised" (by its oonjunotion with the agent intellect as acting
on it) to Where it oan serve as the instrument whereby its intelligibility
is reduoed--by the agent intelleot--trom a potential to an actual state.
This, then, is the function of abstraotion, the presenting of the
essenoe ("from" the "illumined tl phantasm) to the possible intelleot, and
the oonsequent generation of the intelligible species.

As for the possible

intelleot, "in being impressed by the abstractively iBmaterial form Which
determines the essence of the object, it is impressed immediately by the
objeot; and by this similitude it knows What the objeot is. "27
With this it would seem that the "intelleotus agens" has oompleted
its immediate work in regard to the aoquisition of knowledge.

It has, but

only as far as being the liaison between the phantasm and the possible
intelleot, between sensible and intelleotual knowledge.

27 J. L. MeKenzie, "Abstraotion in st. Thoma.".
IX, 1934, 91

But there are yet

Modern Soh.olman,
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28 De Ver., IX, 1, ad 2J ct. also X, 13.
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with either the one immediately abOYe or belowJ for st. Thomas maintains
that the highest and lowest in any of these olasses have powers or operation muoh akin to the lowest and highest ot the grades that flank it.

Thus,

in the classio example, the "estimative sense", which "judges of intentions".
is a power of the highest animals,
the lowest intellectual oreature,

~ich

olosely approximates the power ot

~.

However, it is not in this, as suoh, that the hierarohical arrangement
of reality is of value tor oonsidering the agent intelleot.

For this order

means much more than a similarity of power in intellectual sUbstanoes; for
suoh substances it really means a sort of natural order "oommunion or
saints".

This last is most fully evident in Aquinas' philosophy in his

theory or angelic knowledge, in whioh a "lower" angel knows 80mething more
becauae a "higher" angel makes its own more universal knowledge evident
even to this lower speoies.

But these highest intelleotual creatures not

only "illuminate" each other, but have their ertect on the lowest intelleotUal creature, man, (in the Christian religion this eftect is part ot their
ministry). "since the order ot Divine Providenoe disposes that the lower
thiDgs be subjeot to the aotions of the higher •••• just as the interior
angels are illumined by the superior. so men, Who are interior to the angel.,
are illumined by them."29

The etfeot of this on man is, that his intelleot

is strengthened and the more his intelleot is so strengthened, "so much
higher an intelligible truth can b. elicited from the species derived trom
oreatures.,,30 Henoe, as the nobler, the higher, the more perfeot and full

29 Sum. Theol., I ,Ill, I,Resp.
30 Sum. Theol., I, III~)l.ad 2.
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in being aids the lower,

SO

can the "intellectus agena n as the aot of the

possible intelleot--and consequently the nobler of the two--aid and
strengthen it.
Previously it was shown that light oan only be spoken of nin the way
_

would speak of oorporeal light".

Now oorporeal light is the medium by

whiohwe .ee, and serves sight in two definite ways; in one way, in that
through it something is made visible in aot whioh was formerly only visible
in potency; and in another way, in that the visual power ia itself
strengthened for seeing.

(~hus

intelleotual light oan be oalled "the very

vigor of the intelleot for understanding", or even that by whioh something
i. made known to us.)

Hence, an illumination ot one intellect by another

is two-fold; first, by it an intelleot i8 made strong, or stronger for
knowingJ seoondly by it an intelleot ia "ledn (manuduoitur)to the knowing
of something.

But these two are oonjoined in the intelleot, "as oan be

.een when something, by means ot a medium

~ioh

the mind oonoeives, so

strengthens the intelleot that it oan now understand things whioh it previously oould not. uSl
Aooording to this, one intellect is said tc be illuminated by another
"inasmuoh as there is given it some medium of knowing, by -which it i.
strengthened for the understanding of things which it could not previously
know. "32

~hus, for instanoe, a teacher,

by

his spoken word, gives to his

pupil a oertain medium through whioh the student'sintelleot is made able
t.

Zl De. Ver., IX, 1, R••p.
32 Ibid., IX, 1, Reap.
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to understand things Whioh were not, and could not be understood by him
previously.

And this "strengthening" of a potenoy, and its perfeotion

oomes naturally fram its oonjunotion with its aot.
Now, sinoe everything understood is understood by What oan be oa11ed
the \trength of inte1leotua1 light", the very thing understood, as suoh,
inoludes in itself the inte11eotual light as partioipated, through whose
power it has it in itself to strengthen the intel1eot.

Just as, in the

example above, it is obvious that the master gives something to his pupil
through the medium of demonstration, Pin whioh there is a partioipation of
the light of the agent inte11eot ••• and the same applies to all seoondary
prinoiples whioh are proper means of demonstration".$

Therefore, the

third funotion of the "intelleotu8 agens" oonsists in its giving--via its
instruments, the tirst prinoiples--the possible inte1leot the power to
understand, to know 'What it oould not have kno1'11 betore--Uto this end, that
it might be led to knowing."

For, a8 without abstraotion there oou1d be no

"ohange" trom a sensible to an intelleotual status for the objeot to be
knoWB, so here, oou1d there be no knowing, or judging the objeot without
the inte11eot·s having given the power (via its instruments, as was shown).
With this" strength", the possible intelleot may now know its proper
objeots.
J.f "strengthening" the possible intelleot appeared to be a diffioult
and nebulous thing, the fourth of the funotions ot the "intelleotus agens",
that ot "making evidentli the first prinCiples, will be found to be more

33

Ibid., lX, 1, ad 2.
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concrete and less difficult.

This funotion--a "part" of the third tunction--

is indicated in its substanoe in these words'
the possible intellect cannot, however, haTe
knowledge of the. prinoiples exoept through
the agent intellect. For knowledge of the
principles is received from sensible objects •••
but the intelligible oannot be received from
the sensible exoeit via the abstraction of the
agent intellect. 3
Thus St. Thomas attributes to the "intellectus agens" Bot only that it
"produoes a speoies by abstracting and rendering objects intelligible in
aot, but also that it illumines the possible intelleot, manifesting by its
light the first prinoiples, and through the medium of these, those things
which are known through these prinoiples ••• n35
This funotion is, of course, basically a corollary of the faot that
only via an active intellect can any knowledge at all be engendered in the
mind; but it is not for all this something as immediately to be seen as
"illumination" and "abstraction".

Now this is not to be taken in any way

to mean that its importanoe is less than that of other functions.

On the

contrary, it is, in fact, the very cornerstone of all human knowledge, and
has eTen been considered by some to be the very essence of an "intellectus
agens" ("some indeed believe the agent intellect to be nothing else than
that habit of indemonstrable prinoiples which is in us"36).

Now that such

adulation be given the first prinoiples is to exaggerate,yet, whatever all
the first prinoiples Thomas speaks of be, they are for his philosphy of
total importance; for if--"per impossible'l--they could be shown false,
34

De An., IV, ad 6.
35 John of st. Thomas, X, 4.
36 De An., 5, Resp.
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he should have to admit that his whole philosophy (as well, of oourse, as
all "scientia") had only a probable, if indeed any, basis.
But here it must be noted again that this effect of the agent intellect
"is not immediately effeoted by it, but mediately, inasmuch as in the
speoies thus abstraoted the strength of the intellectual light shines forth,
renderin~

the objects themselves intelligible--wnich objects oan then serve

for making other objects attainable and manifest. n37

Through the medium of

the "impressed" speoies the "intelleotus agens" thus "flows into" all the
acts of the human intellect (cognitions).

All knowledge, even the habit of

first principles, is trem the sensea--"we know even the very indemonstrable
principles themselves by abstracting from singulars."3S

But sensibles are

objects Which are rendered intelligible in the very species which the
"intellectus agens" had abstractedJ "whence it is necessary that the agent
intellect be prior to the habit of principles as their very cause."39
And fram these considerations can now also be delineated the last of
the functions of the "intellectus agens" to be considered here--"and thus
it is clear that the intellect in aot does not suffice for reduoing the possible intellect trom potency to aot without the agent intellect} but in this
reduction the agent intellect acts as an artificer, and the principles of
demonstration as inatruments. n40

37 John of St. Thomas, X, 4.
3S De An., 5, Resp.
39 Ibid., 5, Resp.
40 Ibid., 5, Resp.
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Nor oould any other

inflo~ng

have been expeoted, since the agent

intelleot oannot "illuminate" by knowing, nor by produoing some habitual
light in the intelleot.

For were there suoh a habit, if it were aoquired,

it would be made through the medium of some oognitive aot; if it were
infused, it would not be made at all by the agent intellect, but by God.
Therefore the active intellect is said to manifest the first principle
by its light,
not as presenting t~is very light, wnich is
the habit of first principles, because this
habit is aoquired through some act of cognition (sinoe it is not an infused, nor an
innate habit) ••• but tram the very oognition
of the terms there is generated an assent to
the prinoiples and the habit itself is
produced.'l
But, since it needs nothing for this assent exoept the explioation of the
terms--and this through the speoies themselves as in the first plaoe
abstraoted by the agent intelleot--the manifestation of first prinoiples is
of the "mediate" nature just desoribed.

41 John of St. Thomas, X, 4.

CONCLUSION
Acoording to the prinoiples of St. Thomas Aquinas. there exists a
necessary proportion between the object of knowledge and the human oonditions of knowledge.

Granting that the proper objeot of the human intelleot

is the essence of a material substance. there follows, as a necessary
oonsequenoe, that there must be a I1turning to" material things for our
knowledge.

FrQm this arises the necessity of assigning the intellect some

aotive, abstraotive power
might be known.
indisp~nsable

~ereby

the essenoes "enoased" in this matter

And in this act of attaimnent there seems to be oertain

"parts", these, under the names given above, are the funotions

of the "intelleotus ageDs".
However, all that has been said would be valueless, unless it be
remembered that the "intellectus agens" is not an observable fact.
based on what is
potenoy and aot.

~olly

It is

basic in Thomas' thinking. namely, the dootrine of

But this does not make the resulting coclusions less,

but rather more, ineluotable.

The active intelleot and its functions are

pure metaphysioal neoessities.
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